“This, to rebut Minister Colm’s Imbert’s allegations about who introduced the criminal element to the Unemplyment Relief Programme and, to show how social injustice is inherent in Trinidad and Tobago government policies and practices.”
Five Rivers,
Arouca,
Trinidad and Tobago.
January 31st, 2008.
“Works Minister Colm Imbert yesterday blamed the United National Congress-Alliance for the gang warfare, saying that it was the then UNC government which funded criminal gangs, put them on the URP payroll and "caused young men of Laventille to turn away from the straight and narrow path.” (Trinidad Express: Thursday January 31st 2008- “Imbert: UNC introduced the concept that crime pays”.)
PREAMBLE:
Man, being a social animal, has, individually, to benefit from certain universally accepted rights and privileges in order for the society to which he belongs also to receive the same benefits.
The first article of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights therefore dictates that:
“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”
The accepted modern-day idea of social justice as a natural right comes out of this background, and assumes that social injustice in many, if not all, societies does exist, since, in all such societies, some inequality exists. The idea also assumes that, in order to achieve social justice, a greater proportion of a country’s wealth will have to be distributed to those individuals in it who have a greater need, for whatever reason or, as stated by John Rawls: “…the distribution of wealth and income must be consistent with both the liberties of equal citizenship and equal opportunity…”
Indeed, the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago in its preamble identifies that social justice exists in a society where “…the operation of the economic system results in the material resources (wealth) of the community being so distributed as to subserve the common good, where there are adequate means of livelihood for all, where labour is not exploited or forced by economic necessity to operate in inhumane conditions and where there is opportunity for advancement on the basis of the recognition of merit, ability and integrity….”
A socially-just society may therefore be defined as one in which the share of the society’s common wealth that each member receives is calculated by assessing his or her unique needs, and not by employing some simple arithmetical formula such as dividing the wealth in equal portions across the board. In civil societies, it is the government’s responsibility to ensure that social justice prevails, as the government is the agency, which has the vested authority and power de facto to make and enforce laws.
Caribbean countries individually, or as a part of some larger geographic grouping, all belong to the United Nations. But the political systems under which they operate vary.
Some, like most of the former British and Spanish colonies (Trinidad and Tobago is one of these), profess to be democratic; others like Martinique, Guadeloupe and French Guiana are part of France and therefore democratic, Cuba is socialist/communist, yet, in others, like the Central American countries, there is a mixture of socialism/democracy and, by any definitions, Haiti is anarchist.
There is no dispute that food and shelter are two of the most basic of human needs. In the case of the modern human, money is needed to satisfy both needs; and money is earned mainly from employment.
One and all is familiar with the term full employment that economists so often use. Full employment exists when there is a job available for every person who is in need of one. And all countries strive towards that ideal. Using the same concept, one may say that full shelter exists when there is adequate shelter available for everyone who is in need of it, and full shelter, just like full employment, is an ideal towards which any non-despotic government would strive.
One may therefore use the ability and performance of a country in directly providing, or in facilitating the provision of, continued paid-employment and adequate housing for its citizens, especially those who are most in need, as a potent litmus test in deciding how socially-just such a country really is.
For the thereof justification of the topic at hand, this discourse will look at two areas: the operations of the Housing Programme of the Settlements Ministry and, the Unemployment Relief Programme in Trinidad, during the period 1973 to 2005 (it’s almost impossible, at this time, to get the accurate figures for the period beyond 2005).
MINISTRY OF SETTLEMENTS:
Trinidad and Tobago is, by any standards, a wealthy country: it is blessed with copious and extremely valuable mineral resources (clean air and water, oil, natural gas, asphalt); it possesses a well-established and productive manufacturing industry; its ecological resources are the foundation for thriving agricultural, fishing and tourism sectors and its world-famous Carnival, annually generate thousands of millions of dollars in direct and indirect income and revenue.
All of these assets, when added to a relatively modern and efficient communication infrastructure system and highly literate population, have combined to make Trinidad and Tobago, net per capita, the wealthiest nation in the Caribbean. So, with a population of just one million, three hundred thousand souls, one would expect that in Trinidad and Tobago, every citizen would be equitably benefiting from the National Pie.
Besides what has already been mentioned, the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago declares that its citizens are all born with and, so, naturally entitled to enjoy, a number of rights and freedoms, for instance,
· the rights to equality before the law and
· the protection of the law,
· the right to the enjoyment of property and,
· the right not to be deprived thereof, except by due process of law.
· It also gives its citizens the guarantee that they will be protected from arbitrary imprisonment, detention or exile or cruel or unusual treatment or punishment.
The Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago, in other words, seems to be rooted in the principles of social justice, since it attempts to spell out the framework wherein the society will set about to ensure its citizens all receive equal and equitable treatment.
Yet, when one takes a close look at the situation in the housing sector, one observes, as admitted on October 4th 2006, by Prime Minister Manning, then, also, Minister of Finance, in his 2006 National Budget presentation, that there is a need to provide at least ten thousand new homes per year in order to clear the backlog of demand for homes by persons who do not possess adequate shelter and who, without help, cannot afford to acquire their own homes. It is also an admission that, at that date, there were some one hundred thousand families that needed to be housed, but that cannot, on their own, afford housing.
This number represents approximately twenty-five percent of the adult population of Trinidad and Tobago! An inordinately high number, by any measure.
The figures take on much more mind-boggling proportions if one assumes that each such family has six members, since such calculations would reveal that, in 2006, about six hundred thousand citizens, or almost half of the entire population of Trinidad and Tobago live in inadequate or substandard housing accommodation.
The question must be asked: how can this situation be possible in the wealthiest country in the Caribbean, one which, as stated before, enjoyed government revenues, over the period covered by the 2005-2006 Budget, in excess of thirty-four billion dollars?
Looking at the Table 1, one observes that, for the period 1973 to 2005, total government revenues exceeded three hundred and twenty-five billion dollars. In other words, over those thirty-two years, the country enjoyed average annual revenues of close to ten billion dollars.
| Year | National | Possible $$ Available | Net $ Available | House | Houses Possible | Actual Houses Completed | ||
| | Income | For Housing Ministry | for Construction | Unit Cost | Annually | YTD | Annually | YTD |
| 1973 | 465,000,000 | 41,850,000 | 25,110,000 | 15,000 | 1,674 | 1,674 | 205 | 205 |
| 1974 | 800,000,000 | 72,000,000 | 43,200,000 | 20,000 | 2,160 | 3,834 | 378 | 583 |
| 1975 | 1,100,000,000 | 99,000,000 | 59,400,000 | 25,000 | 2,376 | 6,210 | 450 | 1,033 |
| 1976 | 1,250,000,000 | 112,500,000 | 67,500,000 | 30,000 | 2,250 | 8,460 | 600 | 1,633 |
| 1977 | 1,500,000,000 | 135,000,000 | 81,000,000 | 35,000 | 2,314 | 10,774 | 894 | 2,527 |
| 1978 | 2,000,000,000 | 180,000,000 | 108,000,000 | 40,000 | 2,700 | 13,474 | 1,000 | 3,527 |
| 1979 | 2,500,000,000 | 225,000,000 | 135,000,000 | 45,000 | 3,000 | 16,474 | 1,025 | 4,552 |
| 1980 | 3,000,000,000 | 270,000,000 | 162,000,000 | 50,000 | 3,240 | 19,714 | 1,119 | 5,671 |
| 1981 | 3,500,000,000 | 315,000,000 | 189,000,000 | 55,000 | 3,436 | 23,151 | 1,021 | 6,692 |
| 1982 | 4,000,000,000 | 360,000,000 | 216,000,000 | 60,000 | 3,600 | 26,751 | 900 | 7,592 |
| 1983 | 4,500,000,000 | 405,000,000 | 243,000,000 | 65,000 | 3,738 | 30,489 | 995 | 8,587 |
| 1984 | 5,000,000,000 | 450,000,000 | 270,000,000 | 70,000 | 3,857 | 34,346 | 502 | 9,089 |
| 1985 | 5,500,000,000 | 495,000,000 | 297,000,000 | 75,000 | 3,960 | 38,306 | 385 | 9,474 |
| 1986 | 6,000,000,000 | 540,000,000 | 324,000,000 | 80,000 | 4,050 | 42,356 | 400 | 9,874 |
| 1987 | 6,500,000,000 | 585,000,000 | 351,000,000 | 85,000 | 4,129 | 46,486 | 336 | 10,210 |
| 1988 | 7,000,000,000 | 630,000,000 | 378,000,000 | 90,000 | 4,200 | 50,686 | 302 | 10,512 |
| 1989 | 7,500,000,000 | 675,000,000 | 405,000,000 | 95,000 | 4,263 | 54,949 | 278 | 10,790 |
| 1990 | 8,000,000,000 | 720,000,000 | 432,000,000 | 100,000 | 4,320 | 59,269 | 102 | 10,892 |
| 1991 | 8,500,000,000 | 765,000,000 | 459,000,000 | 105,000 | 4,371 | 63,640 | 214 | 11,106 |
| 1992 | 9,500,000,000 | 855,000,000 | 513,000,000 | 110,000 | 4,664 | 68,304 | 379 | 11,485 |
| 1993 | 10,500,000,000 | 945,000,000 | 567,000,000 | 115,000 | 4,930 | 73,234 | 308 | 11,793 |
| 1994 | 11,500,000,000 | 1,035,000,000 | 621,000,000 | 120,000 | 5,175 | 78,409 | 216 | 12,009 |
| 1995 | 12,500,000,000 | 1,125,000,000 | 675,000,000 | 125,000 | 5,400 | 83,809 | 375 | 12,384 |
| 1996 | 13,500,000,000 | 1,215,000,000 | 729,000,000 | 130,000 | 5,608 | 89,417 | 425 | 12,809 |
| 1997 | 14,500,000,000 | 1,305,000,000 | 783,000,000 | 135,000 | 5,800 | 95,217 | 721 | 13,530 |
| 1998 | 15,500,000,000 | 1,395,000,000 | 837,000,000 | 140,000 | 5,979 | 101,196 | 700 | 14,230 |
| 1999 | 16,500,000,000 | 1,485,000,000 | 891,000,000 | 145,000 | 6,145 | 107,340 | 702 | 14,932 |
| 2000 | 17,500,000,000 | 1,575,000,000 | 945,000,000 | 150,000 | 6,300 | 113,640 | 725 | 15,657 |
| 2001 | 18,500,000,000 | 1,665,000,000 | 999,000,000 | 155,000 | 6,445 | 120,086 | 628 | 16,285 |
| 2002 | 19,500,000,000 | 1,755,000,000 | 1,053,000,000 | 160,000 | 6,581 | 126,667 | 665 | 16,950 |
| 2003 | 25,000,000,000 | 2,250,000,000 | 1,350,000,000 | 165,000 | 8,182 | 134,849 | 499 | 17,449 |
| 2004 | 28,000,000,000 | 2,520,000,000 | 1,512,000,000 | 170,000 | 8,894 | 143,743 | 803 | 18,252 |
| 2005 | 34,000,000,000 | 3,060,000,000 | 1,836,000,000 | 175,000 | 10,491 | 154,234 | 767 | 19,019 |
| TOTALS: | 325,115,000,000 | 29,260,350,000 | 17,556,210,000 | | 154,234 | | 19,019 | |
| AVG.: | 9,851,969,697 | 886,677,273 | 532,006,364 | 95,000 | 4,674 | | 576 | |
Table 1: Analysis of “What If?” Housing Scenario 1973 to 2005.
If one are to assume that, over the period, at least nine percent of annual national revenues was being set aside to provide State-subsidised homes for persons in the low income brackets then, some four thousand, six hundred and seventy-four homes per year would have been built. In other words, equity in the provision of homes would have been achieved as there would have been, in 2005, no backlog insofar as low-income earners in need of homes is concerned. A realization which begs the question: why was this not done?
From personal knowledge and unofficial information obtained, the Settlements Ministry (which is the state agency directly responsible for developing, implementing and overseeing Trinidad and Tobago’s entire housing programme), of every dollar annually spent by that Ministry, seventy-three cents was spent in meeting recurrent administration costs, such as, paying salaries and wages to employees who were not involved in the actual construction of homes. This left available just twenty-seven percent of its income to be spent on the clearing of the housing backlog. The obvious inference is that, between 1973 and 2005, the emphasis of successive Trinbagonian government administrations was never geared towards clearing that backlog. Why so? The answer may probably be found by continued examination of government expenditure patterns during the same period.
Between 1973 and 2005, a substantial percentage of the country’s income was spent on sustaining inefficiently-run, poorly-managed State-owned or State-controlled enterprises and agencies. Companies such as BWIA, WASA, T&TEC, Iron and Steel Company of Trinidad and Tobago, and Caroni Limited, at peak, combined, were losing over ten million dollars per day, and incurring billions of dollars in debt through unproductive loans and investments, debt which eventually had to be written off at taxpayer expense. During the same period, several very large-scale, prohibitively expensive, publicly-funded projects were undertaken, every single one of which, in the end, cost significantly much more than they ought to have cost, which, in turn, led to widespread and persistent allegations of massive fraud and corruption in high places.
These allegations were viewed so seriously that, in the 1980’s, several top public officials who were the alleged culprits, including former senior government Ministers, were forced to flee the country, never to return, while others would publicly acknowledge that “all ah we tief”! The infamous Tesoro corruption scandal parliamentary debate, of 1990, brought out that a former President of Trinidad and Tobago (he’s still alive and free as a bird!) had received financial inducement from foreign companies seeking to use his influence to secure lucrative State contracts. Tesoro Limited eventually was made to pay back to the government coffers some U$2.8 million, which it had allegedly corruptly received.
Indeed, the perception of public corruption was so pervasive that some economists and financial analysts publicly opined that as much as fifty percent of National Expenditure over the period had been dishonestly misappropriated by Cabinet Ministers and other public officials!
The net result of all this was that, Trinidad and Tobago’s national income, between 1973 and 2005, rather than being equitably distributed, insofar as the provision of shelter and other amenities for the citizenry was concerned, by and large, ended up being siphoned off into areas, which, up to the time of writing, remain mostly unknown.
In other words, partly because of improper planning and implementation and partly because of corrupt practices by public officials whilst in office, which factors, together, have caused a grossly inequitable distribution of the National Income, as far as the provision of housing is concerned, Trinidad and Tobago as a society, can be called unjust and the fact that six hundred thousand of its citizens who, on their own have, been unable to secure adequate and decent shelter for themselves and their families, can be viewed as irrefutable evidence of such.
Let us now look at the Unemployment Relief Programme.
THE UNEMPLOYMENT RELIEF PROGRAMME:
The Unemployment Relief Programme (URP), in its earliest incarnation as the Depressed Areas Programme emerged in 1957. It was launched by the government as a strategy to alleviate the depressed economic conditions of the communities in which it began.
Essentially, it provided, as it yet today does, irregular, temporary employment opportunities to its intended beneficiaries by hiring them at minimum or below-minimum wage, on community infrastructure maintenance and development projects.
Given its target, from the very outset its beneficiaries were those who were considered the unemployables: the less fortunate of the society, such as the badjohns, the ex-convicts, the scum of the earth. Being who they were, such persons were of that category which found it extremely difficult to obtain honest employment in the formal labour market and which, to this day, is perceived as significant contributors to social unease in the community-at-large.
By 1993 however, as reported by The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)1, the URP had degenerated into a socio-political institution, one that was mainly used by the government of-the-day to consolidate and secure its popular support by giving jobs in exchange for votes. A significant number of those hired continued to be from the criminal ranks as was substantiated in March 1995 (Panday was not the Prime Minister then, Manning was), by Dr. Karl Theodore, of the University of The West Indies, in his just, then, completed a study of the URP.1
At page 31of his report, the professor states (the parenthesized comments are mine):
“In the attempt to provide employment to persons out of work, Region Four (one of its administrative districts, the one which encompasses Bon Air Gardens, Maloney and the Congo at d’Abadie) has placed needy workers into several categories. The intention is to ensure that these persons are given preference in roster-formation, irrespective of their political persuasion. Details of the categories are provided below.
PRISON/POLICE PROBLEMS
The first (his/Region’s Four’s prioritization, not mine!) group comprises ex-convicts and persons who have been accorded a bad police report of character. It is appropriately labelled, Police/Prison problems. Members of this category are the least likely to be hired at other government departments, private institutions and small business, in spite of the skills the might possess (and because of the ones that they do!). The prison authorities are aware of this, hence, they usually give newly-released prisoners letters recommending them for work on URP projects. The URP strives to occupy the time of these former convicts, as well as condition their behavioural patterns into what is socially acceptable. The URP therefore, attempts to act as a welfare provider, as well as a social pacifist.
The same UNDP report further substantiated its conclusion by presenting information on the distribution, by electoral constituency district, of the projects, which the URP at that time was undertaking.
Such information showed a clear bias, in terms of the number of projects, in favour of the constituencies which had supported the political party in power and not, as the URP was originally intended to be, in those communities where there was the heaviest concentration of unemployables or unemployed persons.
Persistent reports of ghost worker gangs in the Programme are in all likelihood a direct consequence of this phenomenon, since the political supporters who obtain temporary employment in URP perceive such benefit as payment for their support at election time, and therefore do not feel the obligation to report for work, except on paydays.
In Table 2 the statistics as they relate to the Unemployment Relief Programme were mainly obtained from several personal contacts who were senior officials of the Programme during the 1990’s.
The statistics are self-explanatory.
| Year | Est. Population | Adult | No. of Adult | No. of | % of Unemployable | No. of Unemployable |
| | of T & T | Population | Unemployed | Unemployables | in URP | in URP |
| 1973 | 1,040,000 | 468,000 | 140,400 | 98,280 | 45% | 44,226 |
| 1974 | 1,050,400 | 472,680 | 132,350 | 95,292 | 60% | 57,175 |
| 1975 | 1,060,904 | 477,407 | 124,126 | 91,853 | 65% | 59,704 |
| 1976 | 1,071,513 | 482,181 | 106,080 | 82,742 | 80% | 66,194 |
| 1977 | 1,082,228 | 487,003 | 97,401 | 77,920 | 65% | 50,648 |
| 1978 | 1,093,050 | 491,873 | 93,456 | 75,699 | 60% | 45,420 |
| 1979 | 1,103,981 | 496,791 | 79,487 | 66,769 | 55% | 36,723 |
| 1980 | 1,115,021 | 501,759 | 80,281 | 67,436 | 60% | 40,462 |
| 1981 | 1,126,171 | 506,777 | 81,084 | 68,111 | 80% | 54,489 |
| 1982 | 1,137,433 | 511,845 | 81,895 | 68,792 | 60% | 41,275 |
| 1983 | 1,148,807 | 516,963 | 82,714 | 69,480 | 60% | 41,688 |
| 1984 | 1,160,295 | 522,133 | 83,541 | 70,175 | 35% | 24,561 |
| 1985 | 1,171,898 | 527,354 | 84,377 | 70,876 | 35% | 24,807 |
| 1986 | 1,183,617 | 532,628 | 85,220 | 71,585 | 65% | 46,530 |
| 1987 | 1,195,453 | 537,954 | 86,073 | 72,301 | 45% | 32,535 |
| 1988 | 1,207,408 | 543,333 | 86,933 | 73,024 | 45% | 32,861 |
| 1989 | 1,219,482 | 548,767 | 87,803 | 73,754 | 45% | 33,189 |
| 1990 | 1,231,677 | 554,254 | 88,681 | 74,492 | 45% | 33,521 |
| 1991 | 1,243,993 | 559,797 | 89,568 | 75,237 | 60% | 45,142 |
| 1992 | 1,256,433 | 565,395 | 90,463 | 75,989 | 55% | 41,794 |
| 1993 | 1,268,998 | 571,049 | 91,368 | 76,749 | 55% | 42,212 |
| 1994 | 1,281,688 | 576,759 | 92,282 | 77,516 | 50% | 38,758 |
| 1995 | 1,294,504 | 582,527 | 93,204 | 78,292 | 75% | 58,719 |
| 1996 | 1,307,450 | 588,352 | 94,136 | 79,075 | 45% | 35,584 |
| 1997 | 1,320,524 | 594,236 | 95,078 | 79,865 | 60% | 47,919 |
| 1998 | 1,333,729 | 600,178 | 84,025 | 72,261 | 60% | 43,357 |
| 1999 | 1,347,067 | 606,180 | 84,865 | 72,984 | 65% | 47,440 |
| 2000 | 1,360,537 | 612,242 | 73,469 | 64,653 | 65% | 42,024 |
| 2001 | 1,374,143 | 618,364 | 55,653 | 50,644 | 65% | 32,919 |
| 2002 | 1,387,884 | 624,548 | 87,437 | 75,196 | 75% | 56,397 |
| 2003 | 1,401,763 | 630,793 | 100,927 | 84,779 | 55% | 46,628 |
| 2004 | 1,415,781 | 637,101 | 114,678 | 94,036 | 60% | 56,422 |
| 2005 | 1,429,938 | 643,472 | 115,825 | 94,977 | 50% | 47,488 |
| AVG.: | 1,224,963 | 551,233 | 92,875 | 76,389 | 57.58% | 43,903 |
Table 2: No. of Unemployable Persons Working in URP >=1 Fortnight.
It is to be noted that in each of the years when there were General Elections in Trinidad and Tobago (1976, 1981, 1986, 1991, 1995, 2000, 2001, and 2002) except for 2000 and 2001, the percentage of unemployable persons accommodated in the URP increased significantly over the immediately preceding year. This fact no doubt substantiates the findings of the UNDP as stated in its 1993 report.
As the major government instrument for the provision of immediate, albeit temporary, employment to the less fortunate, the same UNDP 1993 report revealed that the Unemployment Relief Programme, on average, only employment for a maximum of two fortnights per annum was offered to any one beneficiary. In other words, government, through its URP, despite the billions thereon expended, did/does not really provide sustained relief to whom it said it would.
Dr. Theodore also made observations and drew conclusions strikingly similar to those of the UNDP. In fact, he agreed with them that “…the URP is not the solution to unemployment woes in the country…”, which, by the way, it was never intended to be, for, as stated before, its purpose was to create a lawful income stream, through direct government intervention, by providing government employment to those considered unattractive to the formal work market.
Professor Theodore also referred to the practice, or rather, malpractice, of improper record-keeping by officials of the Programme, a peculiarity, which he rightly surmised hinders the progress of URP and, consequently, the ability of the enlightened observer to accurately assess the true impact of the Programme. I guess that confirms that Minister Imbert must be in the category to which everyone thinks he belongs. Remember, Dr. Theodore’s report was compiled before the UNC-led administration came into power and, even to the most partisan, it proves, by its findings, that the criminal component was, from its conception, an inherent part of the Unemployment Relief Programme.
Nonetheless, what is patently clear, thus, cannot be denied, is that, by 2005, some forty-eight years after first being introduced and despite it many flaws and the low productive output it generates, no government has been able to devise a mechanism altogether to replace it and all generally seemed content to use it mainly for achieving partisan political ends.
For anyone, therefore, to objurgate the UNC as being the culprits who introduced the criminal element into the URP, is most obnoxious, most obnoxious indeed! For such castigation, were it on the back any single organization pointedly to be applied, one would think that it would be to that of the PNM, not any other and, certainly not so to be applied by the likes of Minister Colm Imbert, the Honourable Member for Diego Martin East, who, as the Hansard of the House of Representatives debate on Friday, July 23rd 1999, for posterity records the chastisement he received from Dr. Morgan Job, as follows:
“Dr. The Hon. M. Job: I agree without reservation with the Member for Diego Martin East that we need to deal with corruption because of its consequences and cost; costs to democracy, liberty, freedom. The potential to subvert the correct order of mankind is so great when we allow corruption to run rampant, that we need to empathize with and support the Member for Diego Martin East and this is what I did. I am supporting him. All I am asserting—and I know before I sit this afternoon, that the audience and the court would agree with me, that his argument was irreparably damaging, corrupted, subverted, and vitiated by his concentration and partisan politicking and ignoring the fundamental substance of the issue, which is, that we need to have laws and the institutions and the wherewithal to ensure that those who are corrupt must be brought to justice.
You cannot deal with corruption in this country if you are going to look at it as a problem that emerged in Trinidad and Tobago three years ago. That is wildness. That is intellectual irresponsibility; it is chicanery and sophistry...”
Dr. Job further went on upbraiding MP Imbert when he let him know that it was the UNC-led, Panday administration which brought the laws to deal with corruption in public office onto the legislative agenda by advising:
I happen to know that I am part of a Cabinet that is in the process of passing a Bill which came before Cabinet. I cannot remember if it was approved—I think it was approved—dealing with this very same issue. Until that Bill comes to this House, Mr. Speaker, there is no law here. These people were in government for 34 years. They never thought it fit to do that—never thought so!”
It is hoped that, from the information presented, what herein was set out to be accomplished has, indeed, been achieved.
1 The Unemployment Relief Programme: A Case Study in Productivity: Dr. Karl Theodore, Dep’t of Economics, UWI, St. Augustine, March 1995.
